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Wage Flexibility and Openness
Abstract
This paper analyzes the degree of short—run, real wage flexibility in a
two—sector economy under floating rates. This is done by deriving optimal
wage indexation in a contracting framework. We find that the more closed the
economy, the lower the degree of wage indexation. As a result, output will
fluctuate less around its desired level in a more closed economy. These
findings further imply that a given unexpected monetary shock will cause a
smaller output shock in a more open economy, whereas a given real shock will
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(215) 898—7409I. Introduction
Recent experience with flexible exchange rates suggests the existence of
cross—country differences in the flexibility of real wages and in adjustment
pattern to various shocks. For example, changes in the exchange rate appear
to affect the price level in Europe, whereas they affect the level of exports
and imports in the United States. The apparent sensitivity of wages to prices
and exchange rates has led various authors to consider how wage indexation is
related to the underlying economic structure.' Their findings suggest that
different degrees of wage indexation generate different degrees of short—run
real wage rigidity, which in turn implies different adjustment patterns to a
given shock. Thus, understanding the determinants of optimal wage indexation
might explain the existence of cross—country differences in adjustment
patterns.
The purpose of this paper is to focus attention on the role of openness
in explaining the degree of short—run real wage rigidity. The analysis
investigates how optimal wage Indexation is affected by the degree to which
domestic output is exposed to the prices of internationally traded goods. A
useful analytical simplification is to consider the case of a two—sector
economy in which we dichotomize between traded and non—traded goods. In such
a model, the country is taken as small in the traded sector (i.e. it is a
price taker for traded goods) and large in the non—traded sector. Thus, there
is one relative price determined endogenously——that of traded to non—traded
goods. For a given relative price, the exchange rate sets the price level. A
larger share of traded goods implies a larger exposure to international
prices, diminishing the economic relevance of the endogenous determination of
the relative price of traded to non—traded goods. This paper investigates how
the endogenous determination of the above relative price affects wage
—1—indexation. This is done by applying the wage indexation approachformulated
by Gray [19761. This approach was used byFlood and Marion [19821 in the
context of a one sector open economy, and the present paperextends their
contribution to the case of a two—sector economy.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the optimal wage
indexation and conducts the comparative statics. Section 4 summarizesthe
findings, and provides concluding remarks. The Appendixsummarizes the
notation used in the paper.
2. The Model
Let us take a two—sector economy, producing traded and non—traded goods,
under floating rates and perfect capital mobility. Consumers are assumed to
have Identical hoinothetic tastes, generating a price index given by
0 0
(1) Pt = n • z
where and are money prices of traded and non—traded goods at time t,
and 0 and are the share of non—traded and traded goods. Real output, 1,
is given by:
(2) Y =(N
•P + Z •P )/P
t t n,t t z,t t.
where N and Z represent the output of non—traded and traded goods. The demand
for non—traded goods is given by
• • exp(c—c(I
—
—2—a is the compensated demand elasticity; I is the money interest rate, and ii
isthe expected inflation:
(4) =(EI÷i —Pt)/P
where Et is the conditional expectation operator which corresponds to the use
of information available at period t. A higher real interest rate discourages
current consumption, and c is the interest rate semi—elasticity of demand for
non—traded goods. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the information set
at time t contains the structure of the model and all variables dated t and
earlier.
The demand for money balances is given by:
(5) Pt •exp(—k.i).
The country operates under a floating rate regime, and the law of one
price is assumed to hold for traded goods:
(6) P =S •
z,t t z,t
where St is the exchange rate at time t (domesticmoney price of one unit of
foreign exchange) and is the international price of traded goods. Under
conditions of perfect capital mobility, and the absence of risk aversion, an
arbitrage condition links the domestic and foreign interest rates:
(7) i —i=S1
—S)/S
—3—To formulate short—run wage rigidity,the paper adapts the contracting
approach to the Phillips curve.It should be noted that there exists a gap
between a contracting approach to the Phillips
curve and labor contracting
theories. The contracting approach tothe Phillips curve (as in Fischer and
Gray) has not so far been derivedfrom a strict micro foundation, (asFischer
(1977) has recognized). It is capable, however,of modeling the interaction
between the money market and the Phillips curve.On the other hand, theories
of labor contracting are derived from amicro foundation; but so far those
theories have not been able to formulatein a satisfactory way the effects of
money and financial assets onlabor contracts. Because the focus ofthis
paper is on the interactionof the money market and labor contracts,it
applies to the Phillips curve thecontracting specification (as used by
Fischer and Gray), that has become a conventionin the macro literature.
These authors consider the case of an economywhere nominal wage contracts are
negotiated in period t—1, before current pricesare known, so as to equate
expected labor demand to expected labor supply.But actual employment in
period t is demand—determined, and dependson the realized real wage. These
models also allow for partial indexation,which may be set according to some
optimizing criteria. For a recent applicationof the contracting approach in
an open economy see Flood and Marion(1982) and Marston (1982).
Suppose that the labor supply is given by
w
(8) L =




= (L)n • exp v
where L denotes the labor employed in sector x (x = n,z) in period t,and
v
is a multiplicative productivity shock. To close the model,let us specify
the stochastic structure. Money and foreign prices are given by
(10) Mt=Ms expm
(11) =exp p
To simplify exposition, let us neglect trends in the variables, assuming
that m, v, i, p are uncorrelated random variables, generated bywhite noise
processes:
2 **
(12) x —N(0,a) for x = m, v, I ,p
As a reference point, let us start with the •non—stochastic equilibrium,'
i.e., the equilibrium in the economy if the value ofall the random variables
is zero (m = v = 1 = p = 0). Suppose that prices in such an equilibrium
are given by = = S = 1. Let us denote by lower—case variables the
percentage deviation of the upper—case variable fromits value in the non—
stochastic equilibrium, i.e., for a variable X, x = (X —X0)/X0where X0 is
the value of X if all random shocks are zero. To simplify notation, wedelete
the time index. Thus (xt, xt÷k) are replaced by (x, x+k). To facilitate
discussion, it is useful to take a log—linear approximation of themodel
aroundits non—stochastic equilibrium,writing the model in terms of
percentagedeviations. This is equivalent to the use of a first order
—5—approximation of a Taylor expansion around theequilibrium.3
From eq. 9 we get that output is given by
(13) n =h(p
-w)+ h.v




Ina fully flexible economy, w corresponds to the wage that clears the
labor tnarket,i.e., w =(W
—W)/Wwhere is the flexible equilibrium
wage rate derived from eq. 8—9, and W0 is the equilibrium wageif
**
v=p=i=m=0.Under the labor contract, the wage contract for period
tispre—set at time t—1 at its expected money wage level in a fully flexible
regime. Thus, the wage contract is Eti .Undera partial indexation,
actual wage is allowed to adjust in proportion to the cost of living increase:
(15) log W =logEr_i + bEP —pup
or, in termsofour shorter notation
(15') w =b'p =
wherew is the unexpected wage adjustment, and p is the unexpected infla-
tion. The case of b =1corresponds to full indexation, whereas b =0is
where there is no indexation. In the first case we get short—run real wage
rigidity, whereas in the second we get short—run nominal wage rigidity. In
—6—general, we expect 0 K b < 1, providing limited flexibility in the contract
scheme. Deriving the optimal degree of wage indexation is the topic of
Section 3. Combining eq. 13—14 and 15'. We get:
(16) y =h(l—b)p÷ h•v.
Notice that h(1—b) in eq. 16 corresponds to the Phillips curve slope. A
lower degree of wage indexation enhances the output effects of unexpected
price changes.
Equilibrium in the non—traded sector implies that:
(17) n =—a(p
—p)+ y —c(i+ p)
Equilibrium in the money market is given by:
(18)my—k1;i=js
Notice that an unexpected price level rise (p >o)induces an expecta-
tion that prices will fall next period by p, implying that the real interest
rate is i ÷ p .Eq.17 and 18 provides the short—run equilibrium conditions
which imply that:
(19) p —p
=— c(i*+ p*)/(On• c +a+ O• h).
A rise in the foreign interest rate, or a transitory foreign price
increase leads to a higher real interest rate, which reduces current demand
for both goods. The market for non—traded goods clears continuously, thus the
—7--relative price of non—traded goods should drop. A larger substitutabilityof
the two goods in consumption (a) or production (h) reduces the needed
adjustment of relative prices.
3. Optimal Indexation and Openness
To be able to drive some normative aspects of indexation, it is useful to
consider as a benchmark the real output attained in a fully flexible
economy. Let us denote by x the value of x in a fullyflexible economy.
Following Gray we adapt the loss function4:
L =E(y—y)
Where E0 stands for the unconditional expectation operator. The loss
function indicates that we wish to choose the wage indexation scheme so as to
minimize deviations from output's fully flexible level (i).
Ina flexible economy, the labor market clearing condition implies that
(21)
- - h
22) y =h•v—h v.
From eq. 22 and 16 we get that
(23) L =()2E((w-p) -( - ))2=()2E0((1-b)p + v)2.
Optimal indexation is chosen so as to make the real wage in a contracting
economy "closest" to real wage in a flexible economy. Its value, derived from
—8—eq. 23, is given by:
(24) b= 1— where
V 2V. +V
=(S+h)[h2 + + k2(1 — 1*
where =c+(a+ 0 .h)/0and V denotes the variance of x.
is the only term that involves the degree of openness. Notice that
* * * I,) \ ab 3b
>0, > 0,—>0.
z
Openness can be measured either by the share of traded goods (0) or by
the substitutability in consumption (a) and production (h) of traded and non—
traded goods. An increase in openness, as measured by any of the above
parameters will increase optimal wage indexation. Thus, we expect a lower
degree of real wage flexibility in a more open economy. Notice also that the
degree of wage indexation decreases with the ratio of productivity variance to
the variance of the other shocks.
The above results can be interpreted in the following way: There are two
type of shocks with opposing effects on indexation——productivity shocks and
all the other shocks. We would like to increase wages when there is a
positive productivity shock (see eq. 21). When such a shock occurs, it is
associated with a lower price level which accommodates the increase in the
demand for money. In such a case we would like to have a low degree ofwage
indexation. We would like to index fully for all the other shocks. Thus,
there are opposing forces at work in setting the desired degree of indexation,
—9—which is chosen in such a way as to balance those forces. Any increase in
V /V ,V/V. or V /Vincreases the relative importance of productivity
VmV v
shocks, enhancing the case for a lower degree of price indexation.
To understand the role of openness, notice that the real interest rate
(1 —it)isgiven by
(26) 1* + O(P — +*(j*+p*) (1 —
Anyincrease in either i or p will increase the real interest rate,
causing a drop in demand for both goods. Because the market for non—traded
goods should clear all the time, the implication is that the relative price of
non—traded goods should drop (p —p< 0) to clear excess supply in non—
traded goods. This adjustment also cushions the initial shock, because it
reduces the real interest rate by O(p —p). The force of this cushion
effect is related to the degree of openness. The more closed the economy, the
more significant the above effect.6 This adjustment reduces the economic
**
importanceof shocks to foreign prices or the interest rate (1 ,p),which
in turn increases the relative importance of productivity shocks, thereby
reducing optimal indexation.
By substituting b* in the loss function, we can verify that
z ah
In a more open economy, higher wage indexation increases real wage rigidity
and deviations in output from its target level. This is consistent with the
notion that endogenous relative price adjustment has stabilizing effects on
output.
—10—From eq. 17 and 18 we get that prices and exchange rate are given by:
(28)





Because reduced openness implies lower wage indexation, we can deduce
from eq. 28—29 that closeness dampens the exchange rate and price level
response to monetary, productivity and foreign interest rate shocks.
Finally, it is of interest to analyze how openness affects output
adjustment to various unexpected shocks. For an unexpected monetary shock (m)
we find that
h(1—b) (30) y —y= . m
h(1—b) + k+1
Because in a more open economy we get higher wage indexation (b), a
monetary shock will cause higher output deviation from the target level in a
more closed economy. On the other hand, for an unexpected productivity
increase (v). We get






Thus, a productivity shock will cause a smaller output deviation from the
target in a more closed economy. In this sense, the more closed the economy,
the more productivity shocks are cushioned and monetary shocks magnified.
—11—4. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the degree of short—run real wage rigidityfor a
two—sector economy under floating rates by deriving optimal wageindexation in
a contracting framework. It has shown that the moreclosed the economy, the
lower the degree of optimal wage indexation. This occurs because endogenous
adjustment of relative prices mitigates the effects of exogenousreal interest
rate shocks. As a result, output will fluctuate less around itsdesired level
in a more closed economy. In this sense, closeness in the economy increases
the flexibiltiy of its adjustment to variousshocKs.7 The extra flexibility
is reflected also in a lower short—run real wage rigidity. This impliesalso
that a given unexpected monetary shock will cause a smaller output shock in a
more open economy, whereas a given real shock will induce smaller outputshock
in a more closed economy.
The above results should not be interpreted as suggesting that there are
benefits to be derived from policies that reduce openness. Cross—country
differences in openness might be the result of differences in absolute size,
transportation costs to other markets and other exogenously given para-
meters. The welfare effects of endogenous policies that affect openness,like
commercial policies, should be treated explicitly in any framework that wishes
to derive "optimal" openness. This analysis suggests a new dimensionin
differentiating a tariff from a quota. For a small country, under certainty,
each tariff rate is equivalent to a certain quota. In the case of uncertainty
and a frictional labor market, a country might prefer a quota to a certainty
equivalent tariff. This is because the imposition of an import quota(in
contrast with the imposition of an import tariff) may be viewed as
transforming a traded good whose relative price is determined in worldmarkets
into a non—traded good whose relative price is determined in the domestic
—12—market. Consequently, the imposition of a quota instead of atariff allows a
small country to benefit from the stabilizing effects of endogenous price
adjustments.
Comments
1.See Gray (1976), Flood and Marion (1982) and Marston (1982).
2.To make the model manageable it is assumed that in the short run,
output/labor elasticities are equal for both sectors. Allowing for
different elasticities have no systematic effect on the results.
3.It is assumed that the variances of the shocks are small enough to make
such approximations useful.
4.This is also the loss function applied by Flood and Marion [19821.
5.This is because we expect the relative price to adjust upward in the next
period. The role of relative price adjustment for the determinationof
real interest rate has been studied in different contexts by Bruno (1976)
and Dornbusch (1983).
6.More closed economy implies d<0,resulting with a lower real
**
interestrate response to i +p(see eq. 26).
7.The effects of openness on the balance of payments adjustment in a
managed float model has been studied by Frenkel and Aizenman [19821.
—13—Appendix Notation
Upper case variables denote levels, lower case lettersdenote the
logarithmic deviation of the upper case variable from the"non—stochastic"
equilibrium.
=pricelevel at time t
=priceof non—traded goods at time t
=priceof traded goods at time t
=realoutput at time t (deflated by p)
N =outputof non—traded goods
Z =outputof traded goods
, = foreignand domestic money interest rate
=expectedinflation at time t
St
=domesticmoney price of one unit of foreign exchange at time t
=internationalprice of traded goods at time t
W
=moneywage rate at time t
—14—= whitenoise productivity disturbances
=whitenoise monetary disturbances
p =whitenoise foreign price disturbances
=V =varianceof x
E =unconditionalexpectation operator
=expectationoperator conditional on information
available at time t





—X)IX =thepercentage deviation of X at time t from its
"non—stochastic" level K0, X being any upper—case
variable defined above
b =degreeof wage indexation
=thevalue of X in a fully flexible equilibrium, X being
any variable defined above.
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